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The Freedom to Choose: The HousingQuestion and Self-Managed Urban Planning in Belgrade
A single-family house is today a burning topic for ev-
eryone, buyers, renters, landlords, banks, and (to a lesser
extent but still as potently) architects and urban design-
ers. However, to imagine it as the most pragmatic man-
ner of housing for an urban population and as an im-
plicit metropolitan feature may not have been a histor-
ical inevitability for urban-planning practice half a cen-
tury ago, least of all, in the socialist world. It is precisely
around this form of dwelling thatmanymetaphorical bat-
tles have been fought as a subject of Cold War competi-
tion. Today, its ascension as an imperative is supported
by many, primarily globally linked, financial factors, but
it would be incongruous to assume that it was urban
planners’ own favorite proposal as the form most suit-
able for dwelling in contemporary cities. Although not
stated explicitly as its primary research purpose, Brigitte
Le Normand’s book unpacks the reasons why the ideal of
a single-family house came to influence urban-planning
practice in Belgrade, the capital of socialist Yugoslavia,
and ultimately influenced the division between the pro-
fessions of urban planners and urban designers.
Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism,
and Socialism in Belgrade is a volume situated chronolog-
ically between the end of World War II and 1972, with
a focus on urban-planning practice, the necessary in-
stitutional negotiations surrounding it, housing policies,
and consultations of myriad intermediaries involved in
the negotiations (mostly on the municipal level but also
within their various federal dependencies). The book sets
out to study the motivations and ambitions that shifted
the content and aims of urban design and urban plan-
ning in Belgrade: from openly political ambitions imme-
diately after the war, to deliberate disconnection from
such aims by the end of the 1960s, when, appropriating
explicitly scientific discourse and methods, urban design
sought to prove itself apolitical. For those who still situ-
ate socialist Yugoslavia behind the IronCurtain, this book
is one more well-crafted example proving not only that
this is simply not true, since the Yugoslav state broke
off its close relations with the Eastern bloc by 1948,[1]
but also that Yugoslav urban-planning policies drastically
changedwith the new geopolitical relations facilitated by
the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Comintern shortly
after World War II. Although curiously not mentioned
until page 74 of the book, the new policies of work-
ers’ self-management, introduced as early as 1950, espe-
cially affected the handling of the housing shortage in
the case of the rapidly growing Belgrade. One important
part of Le Normand’s argument subtly explains how non-
prescriptively the practice of Yugoslav self-management
unfolded for Belgrade urban planners. While the plan-
ners were taught by and also practiced in the realm of
the modernist architectural tradition—some of the archi-
tects even worked in Le Corbusier’s office—the Yugoslav
interpretation of socialist equality, coupled with the be-
lief in citizens’ “freedom to choose” their most desirable
form of dwelling, Le Normand suggests, represented a
challenge to the modernist mind-set.
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LeNormand’s research is fascinating for its depth and
for the scope of the local resources read and analyzed:
from daily newspapers, books, and journals to minutes
from numerous meetings and internal committees and
interviews, in the original Serbo-Croatian and not pre-
viously discussed in English. Set in chronological or-
der, the text aims to follow the change in attitudes of
urban planners regarding the scope of their interdisci-
plinary tasks, and indeed, the interactionwith and partic-
ipation of citizens in voicing their preferences. Already
in chapter 1, “Modernist Functionalist Planning in Global
Context,” Le Normand describes users of the newly built
housing as consumers, by drawing parallels with the re-
cent historical research on consumerism and tourism.[2]
This, we are told later, produced a shift in planning prac-
tice toward accommodating consumers’ own wishes.[3]
But the author stresses an important detail less clearly:
that the flat was not so straightforwardly understood as
a commodity in socialist Yugoslavia—especially in newly
designed New Belgrade, where most citizens did not di-
rectly own the property they lived in.[4] Quite in accor-
dance with the above-mentioned belief in the absolute
correctness of consumers’ demands, the text aims to ren-
der citizens’ viewpoints and emphasize differences re-
lated to their material situation and the unequal positions
of various Yugoslav workers. It is explained in chap-
ter 2, “A Blueprint for Modernity,” that, consonantly to
this inclination to understand users as consumers, plan-
ners almost from the beginning adopted a pragmatic at-
titude, rather than putting forward utopian plans. The
author here also introduces us to the formation of some
important institutions for the progress of urban-planning
practice on the federal level, such as the office of Bel-
grade’s Main Architect later to become the Town Plan-
ning Institute and Standing Conference of Cities in Yu-
goslavia. She devotes a chapter to the material from an
exhibition, A Dwelling for Our Conditions (1956) held in
Ljubljana, though it is not clear whether this exhibition
was aimed at, or had the same impact on, the wider au-
dience and Belgrade urban planners. Through a detailed
account of various unpublished municipal committees’
meetings and published specialized urban-design mate-
rial, the reader can realize how difficult it was for urban
planners throughout the first decade of Yugoslav social-
ism to balance long-term investment and the need for im-
mediate results. This drove them toward initially adopt-
ing a plan that was as flexible as possible, and that could,
avowedly, be improved if the financial situation changed
for the better.
Le Normand reveals right at the beginning of the
book that there were certain shared characteristics of
urban planning between the specific Belgrade practice
and what we usually call modernist urban planning in
the West, such as: “a new interventionism on behalf of
the national government, modernist architects asserting
their expertise in town planning, a consensus that the
state had a responsibility to care for the welfare of its cit-
izens, and a desire to build rationally to redirect scarce
resources to other economic purposes” (p. 29). The moti-
vation behind this claim may be to explain modernism
as a global movement. But more important, it wishes
to emphasize the importance of the Athens Charter as
the role model for the first Belgrade master plan, mainly
through analyzing the new settlement across the river
Sava: New Belgrade from 1948 onward.[5] In chapter
1, the author argues that although the demise of social
housing in Western democracies was soon accompanied
by inflation and rising rents, which paired together, en-
couraged home ownership, the situation in Belgrade was
different, yet not entirely unaffected by this trend. While
this chain of events meant that, for example, social hous-
ing in France was increasingly the place for immigrants
and the socially deprived, unable to secure home by other
means, the newly designed and built apartment blocks in
Belgrade never turned into similar “social housing,” since
they were inhabited by the most diverse social strata, like
doctors, army officials, or unqualified workers. Those
who were housed in such housing were part of a priv-
ileged rather than unprivileged social group, partly due
to contradictions of the presence of elements of the real-
estate market in parallel to the Yugoslav self-managed
socialism and the vagaries of the construction industry.
This, for Le Normand, is the first clear sign of an unequal
society, despite all Yugoslav ambitions for a self-managed
and thus more humane socialism.
While the text on the one hand has the ambition to
show that socialist realism was not very important in
the context of Belgrade planning and architecture, on the
other hand little is done to tacklewith the same sharpness
the unsupported belief that Tito as the powerful leader
of Yugoslavia had an important influence over urban-
planning matters. Indeed, although Josip Broz’s nick-
name, Tito, figures in the title of this book, this seems an
unusual choice, given that in this volume he appears only
marginally, often in the “Tito-Stalin split”[6] or cameo-
like when swiftly reviewing Belgrade’s 1950 master plan.
The focus on Tito in the book’s title is thus less helpful
for the reader and falsely directs attention to issues that
the author, in fact, is not interested in discussing nor
agrees with. The main focus of this study is the diver-
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sity of voices in the urban-planning discipline that have
been present from the start of the process of rethink-
ing the urban development of postwar Belgrade, which
is far from the stereotype of an authoritarian hand driv-
ing obedient urban planners. On a similar note, if more
attention had been devoted by the author to explain-
ing that the self-management shift marked the decision
to drop the ideologically tinted goal of state ownership
in order to embrace “social ownership” (društvena svo-
jina) of both enterprises and housing, the reader would
be in a better position to understand that when Le Nor-
mand talks about “state firms,” she probably means “so-
cially owned” enterprises. These were not always with-
out management conflicts,[7] but were effectively gov-
erned by workers’ councils. Although we read repeat-
edly about the development from the late 1950s of the lo-
cal residential community (mesna zajednica) mostly as a
concept in physical urban planning (prescribing the num-
bers of inhabitants, the functions that it should provide,
etc.), the reader would get a clearer explanation of it as a
contested attempt to design the political—territorial unit
for self-governance in Yugoslavia if the conceptwasmore
consistently analyzed on its own, in a separate chapter’s
subdivision.[8] This would bring some clarity to under-
standing the ambition to raise the importance of the local
residential community in overall governance, as well as
the powerful intertwining between politics and the new
housing concepts. Moreover, this would further help us
understand why a historian invested so much interest in
urban-planning practice rather than architects’ practice
in this study.
The further we delve into the book, the more we are
presented with challenges to the usual idea of a Euro-
pean socialist capital being built and developed by a logic
contrary to the real-estate market. Firstly, the post-1965
market reform deeply contradicts this assumption. We
are told that this is the moment when the “state loos-
ened the control of economy and freed firms to compete
openly on the domestic market” (p. 104). Even before this
explicit turn, we learn that in 1958-59, 4 percent of self-
managed enterprises’ employers’ wages were already in-
vested into the housing sector by deposing the funds into
specialized joint funds for housing construction—one of
those intermediary steps introduced to bring a better
practice of self-management into action. In 1964, the cit-
izens of Belgrade could already circumvent this and were
granted an option to individually buy the flats before con-
struction started through a bank-crediting system, effec-
tively a mortgage. This further sets the scene for the fi-
nancialization of Yugoslav socialism, a bizarre hydra sig-
naling that the banking sector and insurance companies
were equally encouraged and supported by the policies
that were intended to assist self-management. This argu-
ment allows scholars to assume that construction compa-
nies thus had an incentive to start marketing their build-
ings to inhabitants. In a state of affairs where the state
withdrew from the provision of housing and rather cre-
ated a situation where socially owned enterprises had to
compete by their investment, and construction firms had
to follow the logic of the openmarket, it was a question of
time before the single-family house arose as an always-
already proven “cheapest option.” From this we might
say that the question “For whom (and on which terms)
is the single-family house the cheapest option? ” is the
one that Belgrade urban designers kept debating about,
and which Le Normand follows in the second half of her
study.
In the following chapters, chapter 5, “Planning Un-
done,” and chapter 6, “Modernism under Fire,” the con-
centration of the research is strongest when Le Nor-
mand carefully charts the split between the previously
combined interests of social scientists and urban plan-
ners. Social scientists developed a niche through which
to voice criticism of the designers’ and planners’ failures
to provide models to satisfy need for housing by using
surveys. Surveys are implicitly a method that caters to
citizens’ own wishes and desires. This is not urbaniza-
tion seen as the artificial movement of scientific-design
committees in white lab coats, but urbanization under-
stood as a process that encompasses different narratives,
interests, and ultimately, the role of individual choices
in the development of the urban realm. In such a wide
understanding of what urbanization encompasses, ar-
guably, the users’ own design and self-building practice
is not seen as the intolerable, unsanitary, ugly growth
of the city, but is rather used as the evidence that could
question what kind of limitations had both the Yugoslav
state’s turn to deregulation and urban planning pro-
duced. Therefore, what the author decides to call “rogue
building” instead of “illegal” or “wild construction” is
explained as the practice born out of pressure exerted
mostly on Belgrade as the federal capital, created by the
search for jobs in the city by the provincial and peas-
ant population (p. 148). The figures that social scien-
tists provide show that the majority of self-building citi-
zens were not originally from Belgrade.[9] Readers later
learn that there were no mechanisms to tackle this prob-
lem, but they are not reminded that the municipalities
that had the actual jurisdiction over the land and plan-
ning where these “incidents” happened to sprout were
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by this time not equal participants in Yugoslavia’s incon-
gruous socialist-turned-capitalist trio of planning: eco-
nomic, social, and urban during the 1960s. Price deregu-
lation unleashed lucrative disciplines like finance and in-
surance systems to full market freedom (with certain re-
strictions), which municipalities could not compete with.
There was a simple discrepancy between the traditional
viewpoints of the designers to cater for the well-being of
thewhole society, while Yugoslav society with the decen-
tralized system of decision-making process had difficulty
satisfying all the diverse sets of interests registered. The
author even explains that it was public transport firms
or similar Belgrade municipal public service offices that
participated to the least in the joint construction fund-
ing bodies. Hence, public sector employees were those
who most often decided to self-build houses and draw
the attention of the urban planners to their unflattering
situation.[10]
Another important idea is communicated in chapter
5. Because the specificity of Yugoslav socialism meant
that real estate was never completely abandoned or elim-
inated, peasants could capitalize by selling their privately
owned agrarian land. This land would witness exten-
sive housing construction once partitioned into smaller
parcels and sold off, easily becoming part of the city ag-
glomeration only a few decades later. One would think
this renders rogue builders more as a product of open-
market policies lingering on from the prewar Kingdom
of Yugoslavia, rather than socialist bad governance. So-
cialism in this case was not implicitly determining illegal
construction of single-family houses on its own, nor was
this issue ever publicly addressed as such. But I would
go even further to suggest that this problem only starts
to surface because of the discrepancies introduced by the
open market and the blind retreat before the freedom of
individual choice, without any questioning of the fac-
tors that may manipulate consumers’ desires or lucra-
tive financial mechanisms that primarily rely on profit,
not social equality, and that further disturbed the ideal
of workers’ self-management. This would seem to imply
that these individual constructions testify to the Yugoslav
dream becoming more of an individual pursuit, rather
than being the product of a collective. Yet it would be in-
teresting to read about the wider sociopolitical changes,
which rendered some decentralized actors, like munic-
ipalities, increasingly helpless in sanctioning practices,
which worked directly in opposition to the first postwar
master plan, while others became more powerful in sup-
porting it, as in the example of bank loans.
In chapter 6, Le Normand explains how, gradually,
all the other urban-planning alternatives seemed to dis-
appear while the single-family house (and importantly,
coupled with it, individual property ownership!) in
metropolitan Belgrade seems to flawlessly reflect the be-
ginning of the crisis of Yugoslav self-managed society,
with state austerity concerns under way. Most of the
wider political standpoints seemed to present the single-
family house as the most rational (presumably mean-
ing low price and fast construction) way of represent-
ing the democratic will of the individual citizen, which
Yugoslav self-management would ideally embody. We
are not introduced in detail to the remarkable volun-
tary work of the youth brigades that participated in the
building of New Belgrade, although it was perhaps the
most utopian element among the pragmatic aims of Bel-
grade urban planners. This youth mobilization may be
merely anticipated through the explanation in text that
the temporary barracks used by the voluntary brigades
were later abused and inhabited temporarily by the cit-
izens in order to pressure the authorities to get the flat
easier. Only quite late is it explained in the chapter that
this collective and voluntary endeavor was later shown
to have incurred more expenditure for the country than
profit. Thus, in comparison to the later pragmatic ap-
proach claiming eviction from the “rogue construction”
as too expensive for local municipalities, only some dif-
ferent kind of evaluation or symbolic value of these col-
lective efforts could validate such an expensive project
for the state. This example of quantifying the social in-
vestment summarizes well the change of climate, sig-
naled by debates about individual construction as the
cheapest option, and the roots of the turn toward the ap-
proach “small is beautiful” in the later Yugoslav period.
The heated debates over similar calculations not only be-
came a historical trend in the 1960s urban-planning re-
vision but also paved the path toward quantification in
Belgrade urban planning rather than dwelling on design
quality.
Faced with the uncontrollable growth of rogue-
building practice in different forms (from inhabiting old
barracks to building houses on agrarian land), city insti-
tutions together with urban planners considered a loan
(again, a financial product) for the builders. Such a loan,
they hoped, would help incorporate rogue builders into
the taxation system and, to a lesser or greater extent, fa-
cilitate the planned and foreseeable vision of the future
city’s development. But this once more proved to be mis-
sion impossible in Belgrade. Fragmentation of housing
provision may have at first proven statistically cheaper
for the decentralized Yugoslav state, but urban planners
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werewarning that this approachmay have beenmore ex-
pensive in the long run. If some costs (landscaping, elec-
tric and telephone installations, etc.) were not involved
in the cost-efficiency study of the single-house neighbor-
hoods, single-family housing would appear cheaper at
first, but one would need to expect the costs to rise in
long-term planning. While some architects could pursue
their new interest in prefabricated single-family houses
(so-called catalogue homes) to accommodate this trend
and align themselves with rationalization at the same
time, the urban planners’ stance was inherently shaken.
A part of their vocation in any political system (but inter-
estingly more often attributed to socialism because of the
planned economy’s trio: social, economic, and urban) is
to think of the general society’s well-being over individ-
ual interests. In this Yugoslav setup curiously, the wider,
collective well-being proved often to appear too expen-
sive for decentralized actors to favor.
As Le Normand puts it, Belgrade urban planners be-
lieved they knew better than the citizens what the cit-
izens wanted. Curiously, in parallel, urban planners
started to become interested in the “ambiance” (p. 199),
a vague concept that, Le Normand proposes, reflects the
late TEAM 10’s concern for the heart of the city, mostly
through return to Yugoslav republics’ diverse cultural
inheritance comprising rich variety of historical build-
ing typologies. When finally in 1972, aided by Wayne
State University researchers, the Town Planning Insti-
tute embarked on planning the city’s projection for the
year 2000, the fragmentation within the discipline itself
would be revealed as a side effect of the myriad of pre-
viously non-combatted proliferation of ideologically un-
stable and contradictory convictions. When summed up,
they accumulated doubts for the design approach. Even
though this ambitious master plan encompassed numer-
ous meetings with citizens and their comments and dis-
cussions on various matters, according to Le Normand,
much of this did not seriously affect the previously IBM-
software modeled study. An apolitical stance became de-
sirable and legitimated by the latest currents in technol-
ogy, which, rather than offering a mighty design vision,
withdrew into the sphere of predicting the rather less-
tightly controlled growth of the city. Rather than one,
the city would have multiple centers, for which the ur-
ban planners could follow the approximate trends via the
infrastructural network, not, from the position of design-
ers, prescribe the forms of the buildings or even their use.
Interestingly, Le Normand does not mention the study of
Miloš R. Perović (Iskustva Prošlosti [1986]), who was at
the time working for the institute and later had his work
widely disseminated. In his criticism of New Belgrade, a
study arguing for a “humane” scale of blocks and streets,
he partly owed his inspiration to Colin Rowe and Fred
Koetter’s ideas on city in fragments and the impossibility
of conjuring them up into a coherent whole (Collage City
[1978]). Perović’s study exemplifies even a clearer dom-
ination of the single-family house fantasy over profes-
sional urban planners’ confusion of concerns. Although
the author does not dwell much on this issue, I would in-
sist that the latter planning process exemplifies the deci-
sive moment of the ultimate split between the disciplines
of urban planning and urban design, or simply the for-
mer’s splintering into small-scale ambitions, as well as
responsibilities. Interestingly, though, this splitting on
both sides testifies to the fragmentation over the treat-
ment of individual, not collective, matters: either by fo-
cusing on representation of the urban growth understood
as unconditional in miniscule, technical details, or, on the
other hand, designers’ vision that was rather applied to
the individual buildings than on the level of residential
community.
In the last chapter, “Modernity Redefined,” the au-
thor describes the initiatives of the citizens who actually
participated in the many debates when the new master
plan was conceived as not expressing much of an inter-
est in matters wider than their immediate neighborhood
or other than things that concerned them directly. This
should markedly explain the absence of citizens’ interest
for the welfare of the wider society. But the fragmen-
tation of the public sphere was not a one-way process.
Earlier in the book, Le Normand explained particularly
well why self-management’s complex bureaucratic pro-
cedures as practiced on the decentralized level of com-
panies and residential units could not best manage the
idea of “building collectively” through joint funds and
imposed quite regular delays on the achievement of con-
sensus. But one would have to take into account the
fact that contractors functioned effectively like the con-
struction sector in the open-market economy, thus ul-
timately profiting from delays and speculation over the
funds they would be in charge of, too. This is, for ex-
ample, beautifully portrayed in The Dilapidated Dwelling
(2000), Patrick Keiller’s essay film on British housing
problems, showing how, in relation to these specula-
tive delays housing became less attractive for architects.
Fragmenting individual interests into the shapes of in-
dividual houses does not simply come as a desire of the
consumer, but is shaped by delays in the building indus-
try and the liberal treatment of such misconduct by mu-
nicipal authorities. For all these reasons, as Le Normand
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chronicles, although the 1972master plan relied on quan-
titative tools to present itself as an “objective” stance, at-
tempting to disavow the political position of high-social
responsibility does not prove to be apolitical after all. The
narrowing down of their area of interest or indeed, juris-
diction, voluntarily did not make urban planners auto-
matically less accountable for the rapidly declining stan-
dard of urban conditions in Belgrade, affected by the un-
controlled spreading of the logic of single-family houses
everywhere from agrarian land to garages and rooftops.
If the architect Nikola Dobrović criticized Branko
Petričić’s 1956 plan for losing the bigger picture in the
amount of technical detail and information, we can ask
whether this is similar to what Belgrade urban plan-
ners experienced, too. As the author repeatedly explains,
Yugoslav self-management put the worker at the cen-
ter of public attention, but its byproduct was to make
the worker at the same time a neglected part of soci-
ety. In the late 1960s, urban planners clearly wanted to
align themselves with cybernetics, which at the time was
popular in the United States. This was a kind of self-
managing pursuit of the Belgrade-based Town Planning
Institute in order to reroute urbanization as an outcome
of a broader sociological process, rather than urbaniza-
tion as the strict task of the planners. In a bizarrely res-
onating feedback loop, the fragmentation of the housing
produced the division between the previously sister disci-
pline of social science and urban planning. On the other
hand, “feedback loop” theory would suggest that while
individuals could profit from the disjointed fragmenta-
tion of the decision-making process of self-management,
this, in turn, informed urban-design practice, too. Citing
Belgrade architectural historian Ljiljana Blagojević, the
author charts Dobrović’s loss of his position in the city-
planning discipline as the start of the period for “dein-
dividualization of authorship” in urban planning (p. 37).
Implicitly or not, the book exemplifies the fact that the
belief in the individual’s unrestricted and unmanipulated
freedom of choice continuously challenged urban design-
ers’ wishes for their own larger degree of individual au-
thorship in practice, be it through scientific methods or
control over the single-house design.
This book will be an especially impressive resource
for scholars not reading Serbo-Croatian language; a great
deal of the resources analyzed in the volume have not
been discussed before in any similar piece of academic re-
search, although a few architectural historians (whom Le
Normand read and credits with some ideas) worked with
similar material, in a different, often architectural, but
not urban-planning context.[11] Regardless of the crit-
icism that I presented, the book is a valuable and very
detailed piece of research, which will be a good refer-
ence for anyone researching postwar Belgrade in such
disciplines as history, architectural history, and the his-
tory of urban planning, as well as background for ur-
ban sociology-oriented research. More broadly, since it
deals mostly with self-management and the paradoxes
arising from the economic situation of socialism meet-
ing reforms toward open market economy, both the re-
search of urban planning in the context of the Western
welfare state and socialist, state-controlled urban devel-
opment will benefit from this work. Although it sits best
within the body of literature broadly belonging to the his-
tory of Eastern European cities, scholars in cultural stud-
ies, sociology, and urban planning will also find it useful
for comparative or in-depth exploration.
Notes
[1]. It was popularly called the “Tito-Stalin split” and
this is how Le Normand addresses it most of the time.
Compare the identically titled entry in this book’s index
on page 298.
[2]. The author uses the explanation by Patrick Hyder
Patterson of “Yugoslav Dream” in the 1960s as a version
of the American original. See Patrick Hyder Patterson,
Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in So-
cialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2011).
[3]. Explained in more detail in chapter 4, “New Bel-
grade, Capital of Yugoslav Modernity” (pp. 116-117, 137,
146).
[4]. Rather, in New Belgrade, work organizations,
which the workers owned nominally among themselves
after 1950, joined funds to build the new apartment
blocks.
[5]. See, for example, Ljiljana Blagojević, “Strategije
Modernizma u Planiranju i Projektovanju Urbane Struk-
ture i Arhitekture Novog Beograda: Period Konceptualne
Faze Od 1922. Do 1962” (PhD diss., University of Bel-
grade, 2004); and Miloš R. Perović, Iskustva Prošlosti (Bel-
grade: Zavod za planiranje razvoja grada Beograda, 1986)
[6]. This is another popular phrase representing the
1948 expulsion of Yugoslavia from Comintern and often
deemed to be a simplification explaining the event in re-
lation to the leaders only, thus suppressing any under-




[7]. An in-depth ethnographic study of these self-
management’s inner contradictions is Sharon Zukin, Be-
yond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav So-
cialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
[8]. See, for example, how the ideologue of Yugoslav
self-management, Edvard Kardelj, situates mesna zajed-
nica (local housing community) in relation to the citizens,
but also their work organizations and local community in
Edvard Kardelj, O komuni (Belgrade: Radnička štampa,
1981).
[9]. Le Normand chronicles this as findings of one of
the studies by the Federal Institute for Communal and
Housing Questions produced for the Standing Confer-
ence of Yugoslav cities that took place in Split in 1967
(p. 178).
[10]. The numbers shown suggest that 68 percent
of all self-builders were workers and 70 percent of them
moved to the capital from elsewhere.
[11]. For example, see Vladimir Kulić and Maroje
Mrduljaš, Modernism In-Between: The Mediatory Archi-
tectures of Socialist Yugoslavia (Berlin: Jovis, 2012); and
Ljiljana Blagojević, Novi Beograd: Osporeni modernizam
(Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2007).
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